The following is a historical analysis of African American student activism from 1960 to 1963. During this period, a small number of African American activists at UCLA confronted Westwood merchants, apartment owners and employers, UCLA administrators, and reactionary student leaders with evidence of racial discrimination. Because there were so few African Americans at UCLA, the group needed support from other student groups in order to:

1) demand recognition of UCLA NAACP as a “Category I” student organization.
2) protest discrimination by Westwood merchants, apartment owners and employers.
3) establish a “Chancellor’s Committee on Discrimination.”
4) organize support for national civil rights causes, including:
   a) the “student sit-in movement” of 1960.
   b) the student march on the 1960 Democratic Convention.
   c) food and clothing drives for disenfranchised voters in southern states.

UCLA administrators were able to deny UCLA NAACP access to campus facilities by defining the group as a “political organization,” like the Young Democrats, Young Republicans, Young People’s Socialist League, etc. UCLA NAACP maintained that civil rights issues are not “political,” like party affiliation, but “moral issues,” like racial segregation.

What follows is a review of the efforts undertaken by African American students at UCLA to overcome this ban on civil rights issues, amply supported by appendices from the Daily Bruin and Chancellor’s Files from the Library archives. Please view all the noted appendices on the Bunche Center website, www.bunche.ucla.edu or its Facebook page, www.facebook.com/BuncheCenter.UCLA.

BACKGROUND

Prior to the early ‘sixties, UCLA administrators had the UCLA NAACP chapter trapped in a “Catch 22,” due to a strict interpretation of a regulation known as “Rule 17” that African American activists considered a form of “disguised racism.” In order to qualify for “recognized student organization” (Category I) status and use campus facilities, student organizations could not “embroil UCLA in controversial” topics. Civil rights issues were considered “political,” so campus facilities were denied to groups, such as the UCLA NAACP chapter, desiring to debate such issues. UC Berkeley, applying a less strict interpretation of Rule 17 to civil rights issues, was more accommodating. UC Berkeley NAACP had been recognized and involved in issues of racial justice for years. As a result, the UCLA chapter of the NAACP was practically inactive, except for a Research Committee that gathered evidence of alleged racial discrimination in Westwood on three-by-five cards.
This picture changed in the early 1960s as a result of a fortunate set of circumstances. First, Dr. Clark Kerr, Chancellor of the Berkeley campus, ascended to the presidency of the UC system and promised to relax some of the Rule 17 restrictions by means of his revised “Kerr Directives.” Second, Dr. Franklin D. Murphy, Chancellor of University of Kansas, was offered the job of Chancellor of UCLA, with the task of making UCLA equal in all respects to UC Berkeley. Murphy’s reputation preceded him, and this presented a problem for some of the more conservative administrators at UCLA. As news spread that he was considering the position, the behavior of some UCLA administrators in the Dean of Students, Housing and Employment offices began to change in ways that were favorable to UCLA NAACP.

When Murphy accepted the position, Dean of Students Milton Hahn abruptly resigned. It was Dean Hahn who had denied the UCLA NAACP’s application for “on campus” status for five years, using “Rule 17” as his argument. Dean Hahn opposed liberal activists in student government with the McCarthy-like tactic of labeling his critics “Communist” or “Communist Inspired.”

Lastly, further evidence of change was the final defeat of the Loyalty Oath. Two of the most outspoken critics of this attack on academic freedom in Southern California were Professors John Caughey and David Saxon. Their opposition to the Loyalty Oath temporarily cost Caughey his tenured faculty position, when he refused to sign the Oath. The case was ultimately decided in their favor and Caughey was awarded full back pay for the years he was in exile. Their victory paved the way for UCLA NAACP and its allies by challenging the credibility of conservative administrators like Dean Hahn and his successors. One of Chancellor Murphy’s first official moves was to approve UCLA NAACP’s demand for “recognized student organization” status on September 22, 1960.

**A NEW AGENDA**
The 1960 slate of UCLA NAACP officers presented an agenda of direct action:

1) A *Research function* to continue documenting violations of campus and state laws in order to expose and “…abolish discrimination against all minorities in all its spectrums and forms, from *de jure* to *de facto.*”

2) A *Speaker’s Committee* to conduct periodic “*teach-ins*” on the theme: “The changing mask of racial injustice” (taught by UCLA professors, sit-in leaders, victims of the fight for the right to vote, and expelled southern students).

3) A *Direct Action Committee* to protest racial injustice on- and off- campus.4

4) *Action Proposals to the Student Legislative Council,* to punish law violators.

5) *Direct action* protests against violations of campus policies and state laws, if campus and state officials fail to act.

As campus groups learned of the new agenda, it gained the anticipated support that the NAACP hoped to attract from numerous on- and off-campus student organizations (as well as the anticipated opposition from Westwood Young Republicans and some *Daily Bruin* editors).

**RESEARCH**
The UCLA Research Committee revealed its findings on incidents of on- and off-campus discrimination. Research committee members attempted to reach all African American students to record instances of discrimination. Students claiming experiences of discrimination were asked to fill out a 3x5 card (later a Research Committee form, see Appendix 1). This triggered an audit, which began by checking the bulletin boards at the campus housing or employment office to determine whether the offending party continued to use campus services. If a listing was current, an audit team (consisting of Black and Anglo volunteers) contacted the offending party. First, a Black person would check on the availability of the job or apartment. If it was still available, an appointment was made for an inquiry. If the Black person was told that the job or apartment was no longer available, the white person called and followed the same procedure. If the job, apartment or service, denied to the Black applicant was offered to the white applicant, they jointly presented a copy of university or state policy. If the Black applicant was still denied, the offending party was reported to the campus housing or employment agency, or appropriate state authorities.

**THE “TEACH-INS” (Lecture Series)**
Expected challenges to the audit results by some administrators and conservative student leaders prompted step 2 of the Agenda: the “teach-ins.” These lectures were implemented to educate the campus population as a whole about “Racial Injustice in an Era of Civil Rights Activism,” including exclusionary practices by Westwood employers, merchants and apartment owners.
(See Appendix 2). The lectures were highly successful, and attracted more activist members than expected. The increasing number of activists meant increasing pressure to proceed to the “direct action” phase.

THE “SIT-INS”

The growing demand for direct action was deliberately channeled to other important issues. The early ‘sixties was a time when A. Philip Randolph (later joined by Dr. King), issued a “Call for Immediate Mass Action” against the Democratic and Republican Conventions to protest broken promises to African American voters by both parties. Such calls increased the pressure to join the front lines. Over time, moderates declined as a proportion of UCLA NAACP, while those who demanded more direct action steadily grew.

On February 1, 1960, one week after Randolph’s “Call for Immediate Mass Action,” four African American students “sat in” at a Woolworth lunch counter in Greenwood, NC, an action that initiated a wave of student “sit-ins” in other stores in the south and across the nation. This development provided UCLA NAACP its first real opportunity at direct action and “coalition-building.” Picket lines were organized at three Woolworth stores in Santa Monica, Hollywood and Van Nuys (in cooperation with the Southern California Boycott Committee).

Both Dean of Students Atkinson and Associate Dean of Students Brugger personally summoned the UCLA NAACP president to their offices to explain the risk that the sit-in movement represented for our on-campus, student group recognition. In order to obtain that designation, we were advised to refrain from direct action demonstrations when identifying ourselves as “UCLA NAACP,” since such activities were interpreted as a violation of “Rule 17” (and the new “Kerr Directives,” that were designed to replace it). In addition, the UCLA NAACP President was warned about the continuing danger of “communist infiltrators.”

A discussion of these “risks” led to a vote by the membership about the name of the group. When engaged in direct action, such as picketing, the group would refer to itself as “Westwood NAACP” or the “Southern California Boycott Committee.” For additional cover, the group applied for, and received, a charter from the Congress of Racial Equality for a CORE chapter in the nearby Santa Monica/Venice community.

“Westwood NAACP” held the first of its many “poster-painting parties” in the auditorium of the YWCA on Hilgard Avenue across from the campus administration building, on the evening before the first demonstration against the Woolworth chain. The turnout was beyond anyone’s wildest estimates. There was a growing appetite for meaningful civic engagement.

As expected, customers of Woolworth stores complained about the distance to other stores. They parroted the manager’s argument that Los Angeles area stores played no role in the problems in the South, where each store manager was forced to conform. This view was similar to that of UCLA administrators and Daily Bruin editors that claimed desegregation and abolition of “Jim Crow” laws is “unfair” to white people. The NAACP wrote and distributed handbills explaining the bogus nature of this claim. These were circulated at picket lines, at campus “teach-ins,” churches, and other coalition-building activities.

These exercises taught the NAACP picketers the power of moral suasion, which they often used on- and off-campus. The act of picketing or walking to the next store was a contribution to an important moral cause—the destruction of the southern Jim Crow system.

The Greenwood, North Carolina Woolworth store ultimately capitulated in July, 1960, but other places held out much longer. We actually added Friday to the Saturday protest schedule in Santa Monica. UCLA administrators, though aware of the split personality of our organization, seemed increasingly tolerant of our position. That was taken as another sign of the impact of our new chancellor. In September 1960, Chancellor Murphy was inaugurated, and “Westwood NAACP” experienced no problems picketing under names like “Bruin NAACP” and using campus facilities under the name “UCLA NAACP.” (See Appendix 5).

THE HAYWOOD COUNTY, TENNESSEE FOOD DRIVE

Haywood County, Tennessee sharecroppers, under the leadership of civil rights icons Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth, Odell Saunders and Charles Oldham, sent an appeal to the UCLA NAACP to assist share-croppers that attempted to register to vote, only to be driven off their farms by White Citizen Councils and the Ku Klux Klan. They faced the coming winter with trepidation in a location called “Tent City.” In response, UCLA NAACP
launched a food drive that led to a rally and organizing meetings on campus. Members wanted to test how the regulations would be interpreted for such events.

When UCLA NAACP learned that the UC Berkeley Associated Students also collected food for Tennessee sharecroppers, it immediately requested information about how the “Ad Hoc Committee on Racial Equality” of the Associated Students University of California (ASUC) obtained permission to raise funds on campus in the name of an organization with “ASUC” in its name. The ASUC President sent a response, on ASUC letterhead, which clearly indicates that they faced none of the problems that we faced at UCLA (see Appendix 6). It was clear that UCLA administrators were continuing to apply Dean Hahn’s regulations with the same interpretation, such as his refusal to recognize the UCLA NAACP or acknowledge the civil rights movement as a “moral issue” (see Appendix 7).

At the next meeting of the organization, it was difficult to maintain order. The issue was what stand would Chancellor Murphy take regarding the inconsistencies surrounding essentially the same issue that he overruled when he recognized us after Dean Hahn’s five years of bureaucratic denial of our existence. More importantly, was he aware of the games played by UCLA administrators in their widely varying interpretations of the regulations?

The Los Angeles Woolworth picket lines and the Food Drive helped to establish the image of the organization as a leadership group and membership continued to grow. After only a few months, picket-line organizers agreed to form a city-wide coalition to allocate resources more efficiently. Some of the better attended lines were encouraged to “lend” picketers to the more anemic lines. The coalition met weekly with ever-increasing solidarity.

CONFRONTING RACISM IN WESTWOOD
UCLA NAACP managed to curb some of the demand for more direct action protests with the Speaker Committee’s “teach-ins” on topics of racial injustice. More speakers than could be scheduled (including our faculty advisors) participated in the series. Six were chosen for a “Thursday Lecture Series,” well advertised in the Daily Bruin and surprisingly well attended.

But editorials in the Daily Bruin were occurring with increasing frequency in opposition to the activities of UCLA NAACP and its supporters. An editorial appearing on November 29, 1960, observed that we were “...protesting a situation that exists 2,000 miles from here.”

It was time for the next phase in our agenda: “Proposals for Action to the Student Legislative Council.”

THE CHANCELLOR’S COMMITTEE ON DISCRIMINATION
A 1961 Daily Bruin article entitled “SLC Ponders Discrimination in Westwood” announced “a Resolution to adopt a Chancellor’s committee to deal with problems of discrimination in Westwood Village... Still under attack are the policies of discrimination against Negro students by Westwood merchants, revealed by investigations of the UCLA-NAACP, Platform, ACLU and the Westwood Young Democrats...” The resolution was passed unanimously by the Student Legislative Council.

On March 1, 1961, Chancellor Murphy issued a memo to the Committee that stated a positive response to the resolution and requested formation of a committee and a meeting with the committee members.

The memo was addressed to the committee’s three faculty members and two students, highlighting history professor Bradford Perkins as Chairman. Professor Perkins responded on the very next day with a memo to all members of the committee, laying out a tentative agenda that closely resembled the UCLA NAACP expanded research agenda (including on-campus as well as off-campus issues, sources of potential data collection, how the university should act in the event discrimination is found, and the devices it should consider using to combat any issues uncovered).

On April 14, 1961 the Chancellor met with the committee to discuss its first progress report. The report found that Discrimination is firmly established in almost all areas near the campus... Some landlords listing their accommodations with the university housing office have turned away potential minority group tenants, subsequently acknowledging that discrimination was the reason... Some of these halls admit no Negroes, and others apparently have a quota system.
Chancellor Murphy later declared “Discrimination is immoral. We are all God’s children with merely different routes to our creator.” A *Daily Bruin* reporter quoted him in the editorial section the next Tuesday and added, “We hope the Chancellor’s friendly but firm action will arouse certain people to see the light.”

**THE BUREAUCRATIC DELAY GAME**

Although Chancellor Murphy publicly supported discussing the progress report with the students, Dean of Students Byron Atkinson used bureaucratic tactics to delay discussing the issue and took almost a year to comment negatively on it. In a June 12, 1961 memo Dean Atkinson stated:

*I have read it carefully and have discussed it with members of my staff...our whole administrative policy through many years has been based on the principle that education and moral persuasion in the community and not coercion, represent the only conceivable approach the University could take.*

It became clear that the administrators’ main weapon against student concerns was simply to ignore the issues that arose in any given term for two or three years, until the generation of students in the leadership graduated or moved on in some other way.

The activists in the organization were livid and insistent about taking “direct action” steps. Without a doubt, the majority was in favor of a campus demonstration, but in the interim, another off-campus issue exploded in Westwood: the barber shops.

**WESTWOOD BARBER SHOPS**

It was the African students, not the African American students at UCLA, that brought the barber shop issue to the fore. African American students, with and without cars, got haircuts where they lived, and they could not live in Westwood due to racially restrictive covenants and apartment owners. A dormitory building plan was underway, but was only in its early phases.

African students were exposed to the same indignities faced by African Americans, but with greater frequency. The barber shops were their greatest problem, because the two closest to UCLA were owned by brothers, both claiming their barbers did not know how to cut Negro hair.

The UCLA NAACP Research Committee had an extensive audit file on the barber shops in Westwood, with many audits by African Americans followed by white students, all reporting failures to get either haircuts from the Oakley brothers (owners of the two largest shops in Westwood) or commitments to hire barbers willing to cut the hair of African and African American students. The largest shop with the most barbers was the most arrogant, claiming that the problem was equipment, customers, or the inability of his barbers to cut Negro hair.

Several of the auditors undertook an affidavit drive asking Oakley customers whether they would, in fact, stop frequenting his shop were the shop to serve African Americans. One hundred percent of the respondents denied the allegation.

A letter from the California Attorney General’s office indicated the following:

*We are very pleased to learn that apparently as a result of letter directed to Oakley and Paul Barber Shop, they have changed their policy and are no longer refusing to cut Negroes’ hair.*

*...we intend to use the letter from Oakley’s Barber shop...as a basis for approaching the State Board of Barber Colleges with reference to the establishment of a policy requiring barber colleges to teach students how to cut all kinds of hair. (See Appendix 8).*

The UCLA NAACP was gaining more civil rights victories locally. Chancellor Murphy, as usual, was keenly aware of all developments involving UCLA NAACP. Although supportive in some ways, he indicated some displeasure with the fact that we were resorting more and more frequently to protest demonstrations.

**THE FREEDOM RIDES**

The 1961 Freedom Ride was designed to test the 1960 *Boynton vs. Virginia* decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, which declared racial segregation at facilities serving passengers traveling interstate vehicles unconstitutional. Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) had previously attempted to test a 1946 Supreme Court decision, *Morgan vs. Virginia*, declaring segregation on the vehicles travelling in interstate commerce unconstitutional. As a result of this first “Freedom Ride,” called by CORE the “Journey of Reconciliation,” members wound up beaten and, without any hope of federal enforcement of the Supreme Court ruling, serving time on a chain gang in 1947.
The 1961 Freedom Ride planners were determined to take more advantage of the media — especially television. Two buses carrying Freedom Riders left Washington, DC bound for New Orleans on May 4, 1961. They traveled with little incident until they reached Anniston, Alabama, where a mob of Klansmen confronted them and attempted to burn one of the buses with the riders aboard. They failed to kill the riders, but the images of the burning bus reached a worldwide audience at a time when President Kennedy was in an international debate with Russian Premier Nikita Kruschev. The images worked to Kruschev’s advantage.

CORE Freedom Riders continued on to Birmingham and Montgomery, Alabama only to meet with further violence in both cities. Attorney General Robert Kennedy’s special assistant, John Siegenthaler, called for a “cooling off period.” The original Freedom Riders complied, but the Nashville Students Association, led by Diane Nash, decided that this would send the wrong signal to the Klan and the White Citizen’s Councils. Her fear was that all the white supremacist would need to do in the future is resort to violence, and non-violent activists would be subject to ever-increasing brutality. Nashville students arrived on new buses with “fresh troops” to pick up where the original Freedom Rides ended.

When Governor Patterson of Mississippi threatened to jail the Freedom Riders in the State Penitentiary at Parchman if they came to his state, the mantra became “fill the jails of Mississippi.” In the end, it was a tactical blunder by the Governor to challenge young, idealistic activists who were ready to fight for a cause they believed in.

UCLA NAACP coalition members followed this drama with hours of discussion. In the end, those who felt most strongly about the issue decided to answer the call of Nashville students for additional volunteers to help “fill the jails” of Mississippi.

In total over 300 people of all races and ages, many from L.A. and the Bay Area, descended on the jails and prisons in Mississippi, including scores from the West Coast. Thirteen left the San Francisco Bay Area in mid-June and another twenty left Los Angeles in time to be arrested on June 25. Nine arrived from Los Angeles on July 9, twelve on July 15, nine on July 21. I was arrested with a group of fifteen from Los Angeles on July 30. By September, 1961, the Justice Department ordered the Interstate Commerce Commission to enforce the Boynton ruling and ordered the offending “white only” and “colored only” signs to be taken down in all terminals. The Freedom Rides accomplished their goal of desegregating interstate transportation.

Mississippi was far from finished inflicting pain, however. CORE was virtually bankrupted paying for the transportation and legal fees of its riders. CORE asked adults to serve out their time (which had been increased) without bail. Students, however, had to return for fall classes.

Mississippi was far from finished inflicting pain, however. CORE was virtually bankrupted paying for the transportation and legal fees of its riders. CORE asked adults to serve out their time (which had been increased) without bail. Students, however, had to return for fall classes.

THE FREEDOM RIDER LOAN FUND
(March 15, 1962)

The predicament created for student Freedom Riders by the state of Mississippi was critical. In its determination to bankrupt CORE, Mississippi refused to permit CORE’s attorney in Jackson to represent the riders at the arraignment for the appeal bond, as is usually permitted. Each of the more than 300 Freedom Riders was ordered to appear in person before a court of record. Long distance Freedom Riders, like those from California, were especially hard hit by this tactic. Given CORE’s financial situation at the time, each rider had to find the money to pay his own appeal bond, or go back to Parchman for the duration of the appeal proceedings.

Coalition supporters offered solutions, which some pursued without consulting UCLA NAACP or CORE. One group of students asked SLC to recommend to the Board of Control that a loan be made from the Associated Student reserves to cover the costs of bail for five UCLA students who had participated in the Freedom Rides. When SLC refused, a petition was circulated under the initiative section of the Constitution to present the issue to a general student body election.

The students voted in favor of the loan and the question was then presented to the Board of Control, which voted against the loan. In the final analysis, the Chancellor decided against the loan, probably due to advice from his administrators about the possibility of setting a precedent. But he recommended that sources of loan funds that created no such precedent be found and offered to the Freedom Riders.

In one sense, the NAACP did win a moral victory from this outcome, but it was a Pyrrhic one. The Chancellor revoked the on-campus recognition of
the UCLA NAACP, probably on the advice of his top advisors, who saw the likelihood that progressive groups would continue to rally behind the issues championed by African American activists. The conservative students would continue to oppose these issues, and the result would be continuing unrest on campus. Berkeley eventually abandoned its more lenient interpretation of the regulations two years later during the Free Speech Movement.

CONCLUSION

The recognition of UCLA NAACP as a Category I group lasted only eighteen months. During that brief window, the group showed the campus how to organize students of all races in the fight against racial injustice on and off campus, despite attempts by conservatives to limit their efforts. Chancellor Murphy agreed to establish a Chancellor’s Commission on Discrimination, (whose findings showed that discrimination was widespread in Westwood housing, employment and services), but nothing happened as a result.

The conservatives at UCLA ultimately prevailed during this first period by simply delaying action on the findings of the Chancellor’s Committee and convincing the Chancellor that the organization engaged in too many protests (albeit under other names). This infuriated student activists, who demanded even more direct action protests and demonstrations. These controversies ultimately led to the revocation of Category I status. The conservatives prevailed in this first period, but the head of steam they were attempting to restrain would explode as “Black Power” in the years that followed.

NOTES


2 The author would like to acknowledge the splendid assistance of Charlotte Brown, UCLA Archives Librarian and her Research Assistant, Zenobia Bell for her indefatigable support.

3 Rule 17 states, “The University recognizes a responsibility to invite or approve the inviting of qualified outside speakers on important problems, including and religious problems, for promoting the intellectual development of its students.” In effect, this prohibited political or religious speakers on controversial topics on UC property unless first approved by the campus administration. (Rule 17, rev. 6/1/49).


6 At his previous post as Chancellor of the University of Kansas, Murphy used his “bully pulpit” and friendship with Wilt Chamberlain to help integrate the town of Lawrence, Kansas. After he and Chamberlain left, however, Lawrence merchants reverted to excluding African Americans once again. Monhollon, Rusty L, “Taking the Plunge: Race, Rights and the Politics of Desegregation in Lawrence, Kansas, 1960.” Cf.: http://www.kshs.org/publicat/history/1997autumn_monhollon.pdf.


8 Caughey, John Walton. “Farewell to California’s ‘Loyalty Oath.’” Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 38, No. 2 (May, 1969), pp. 123-128. “On December 21, 1967 the wire services reported the death of California’s misnamed loyalty oath. In practical terms, the oath had been a dead letter since a 1952 amendment was passed.”

9 John W. Caughey, the managing editor of the Pacific Historical Review was the employer and mentor of the new president of UCLA NAACP.


12 The slate was Robert Singleton (this writer)-President and Chair of the Research Committee, Paratha Mann-Vice President and Chair of the Speaker’s Committee, Robert Farrell-Public Relations Representative, Sally Williams-Secretary, Roland Baker-Treasurer; and extensive at-large roles played by Michael Grubbs, McDonald Jackson and especially Jesse Morris, our hardest working activist and Chair of the Direct Action Committee.

13 Daily Bruin, Friday, September 23, 1960, P. 1.

14 Daily Bruin, Friday, December 2, 1960, P. 1.


18 One reason for the increasing influence of direct action tactics was the high regard most members held for the Chairman of the Los Angeles CORE chapter, Earl Walter, who was a charismatic local leader and mentor to the activist-oriented student, including this writer.


20 See Appendix 3. The Van Nys line was picketed by Van Nys high school students, who joined the coalition.

21 Dean Atkinson was far more adamant about communist infiltrations than associate dean Brugger. It was not until later that it was realized that he may have been as much a McCarthyite as his predecessor, Dean Hahn.

22 Most officers were members of the Southern California Boycott Committee before joining the NAACP slate.

23 Members of the Santa Monica/Venice Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) made up the at least half of our Santa Monica Picket line each weekend. Arthur Kennedy and this writer alternated as chair and, vice chair, and with Secretary Eugene Rudolph, we organized the line weekly at the Santa Monica Woolworth store.

A few local African Americans also attacked us as “communist inspired,” but they were silenced by a statement of support for our group by the Chairman of the Board of the Santa Monica NAACP, Chester Powell. Mr. Powell, a respected resident of Venice, California, spoke up unequivocally in our favor. Residents of Westside communities who knew Mr. Powell held him in such high regard that some even joined our weekly Woolworth Store sympathy picket line in his honor.

See Appendix 4.

Faculty and administrators, as well as students, attended meetings. Dr. John Caughey and Dr. Jere King of the history department and Mayme Clayton, a law school librarian often contributed to lively group discussions.

The ideas for weekly consortium meetings and the “lending” of picketers among picket lines were the brain-children of Franklin and Kendra Alexander, a married couple who were among the most loyal organizers of the Woolworth picket lines. They also figured importantly later as close friends of Angela Davis during the attempt by the Regents to fire her.


Memo from Professor Bradford Perkins to Committee members Fielstra, Sigleton, Summer and Vandraegen. March 2, 1961.

Report to Chancellor Murphy by Advisory Commission on Discrimination. Carbon copy sent to all members. n.d.


Steve Weiner of the National Student Congress implored Chancellor Murphy to “authorize the use of his name as signatory to protest telegrams”...noting “Nine of the Riders were from UCLA, and they include Bob Singleton, member of the Chancellor’s Committee on Discrimination, and Al Barouh, UCLA representative of the United States National Student Association.” Chancellor’s Office, Murphy 1935-71. Box 122. File 246 “Freedom Riders 1961-62.

Professor John Caughey, the employer of the leader of the group arrested on July 30, 1961, proposed what was the first and, ultimately, the successful solution. He wrote to sympathizers on letterhead with a list of 28 “sponsors” held in high esteem, asking the recipient to “advance the bond needed for .... Our UCLA student Freedom Riders.” Responders contributed an amount greater than the amount needed. The surplus was lent to other California Freedom Riders. The reference to “UCLA student Freedom Riders,” however, was considered a violation of the Kerr Directives, which forbade using the name UCLA in political or social actions.

About the Ralph J. Bunche Center for African American Studies

Established in 1969 as an organized research unit (ORU) of the University of California, Los Angeles, the Ralph J. Bunche Center is one of the oldest centers in the nation devoted to the study of African American life, history, and culture. For more information, please visit www.bunche.ucla.edu, www.facebook.com/BuncheCenter.UCLA, or www.youtube.com/user/UCLABuncheCenter.

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